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EvmENCE-REs !PsA LoQuITUR-EVIDENCE oF SPECIFIC NEGLIGENCE AS
.AFFECTING RELIANCE UPON GENERAL NEGLIGENCE-Plaintiff sued in New York
to recover for injuries sustained in a crash of an airplane owned and operated
by the defendant. Plaintiff's pleading and proof relied upon general negligence
and res ipsa loquitur, but after evidence of specific negligence was elicited upon
cross examination of defendant's witness, plaintiff also used such specific negligence in argument to the jury. The defendant excepted to the jury instruction
which gave the plaintiff the benefit of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. Verdict
was for the plaintiff. On appeal, held~ the plaintiff was entitled to the benefit
of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, but reversed on other grounds. Lobel v. American Airlines, Inc., (2d Cir. 1951) 192 F. (2d) 217.
The plaintiff in a negligence action has both the burden of persuading the
trier of fact that the defendant was more likely negligent than not and the
burden of going forward with the evidence of such negligence until he has
established a prima facie case. 1 However, when the plaintiff's only available
evidence is circumstantial and so remote that a prima facie case ordinarily
would not be established, there are certain cases in which the plaintiff may

1 McCloskey v. Koplar, 329 Mo. 527, 46 S.W. (2d) 557 (1932); 9 WIGMORB, Evx•
3d ed., §2485 (1940).
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rely upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.2 Depending upon the jurisdiction,
either an inference3 or a presumption4 of negligence is raised by that doctrine
if the plaintiff can prove that (1) the injury was received in circumstances
which would not normally occur in the absence of negligent conduct, (2) the
apparatus causing the injury was in the sole control and use of the defendant,
and (3) the accident occurred irrespective of any voluntary act on the part of the
plaintiff.5 The defendant may then offer evidence of the use of due care6 or of
other facts 7 negating the implication of negligence as a cause of the injury. The
accessibility of evidence to the defendant as contrasted with the practical inaccessibility of evidence to the plaintiff is said to be the basis of the rule. 8 Courts
are divided, however, as to whether a plaintiff who alleges specific negligent
conduct may also allege general negligence in order to prove res ipsa loquitur, and
rely upon both for a verdict. 9 It is assumed in the principal case that the New
York courts would have denied the instruction as to res ipsa loquitur had the
specific negligence been alleged,10 the reason apparently being that the plaintiff
should not be allowed the benefit of less stringent proof if he is also in a position to
rely upon specific negligent conduct.11 This reason for the method of pleading
seems insufficient to deny a plaintiff the benefit of res ipsa loquitur when, as in the
principal case, neither his pleading nor his direct proof shows reliance upon specific
2 Byrne v. Boodle, 2 H. & C. 772, 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (1863). Neither Michigan
nor South Carolina recognizes the doctrine, Mitchell v. Stroh Brewing Co., 309 Mich. 231,
299 N.W. 706 (1944); Gilland v. Peter's Dry Cleaning Co., 195 S.C. 417, 11 S.E. (2d)
857 (1941).
3 George Foltis, Inc. v. City of New York, 287 N.Y. 108, 38 N.E. (2d) 455 (1941).
4 Terre Haute & I.R. Co. v. Sheeks, 155 Ind. 74, 56 N.E. 434 (1900). There is some
authority that a res ipsa loquitur case will shift the burden of persuasion, Southeastern
Greyhound Lines v. Callahan, 244 Ala. 449, 13 S. (2d) 660 (1943); cases collected, 167
A.L.R. 658 (1947).
5 Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. (2d) 486 at 489, 154 P. (2d) 687 (1944); 9 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §2509 (1940).
6 Hinds v. Wheaton, 67 Cal. App. (2d) 456, 154 P. (2d) 720 (1945). If a presumption is raised, the defendant must offer rebuttal evidence or suffer a directed verdict.
Prosser, ''The Procedural Effects of Res lpsa Loquitur," 20 MrnN. L. REv. 241 at 244
(1936).
7 Central of Georgia R. Co. v. Robertson, 203 Ala. 358, 83 S. 102 (1919). More
often this type of evidence is said to take the case out of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine.
Parker v. James Granger, Inc., 4 Cal. (2d) 668 at 676, 52 P. (2d) 226 (1935).
8 9 W1GMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §2509 (1940). But the doctrine is applicable even
though plaintiff could have obtained evidence by use of discovery, Menth v. Breeze Corp.,
4 N.J. 428 at 437, 73 A. (2d) 183 (1950), or when the defendant is dead, Weller v.
Worstall, 50 Ohio App. 11, 197 N.E. 410, affd. 129 Ohio St. 596, 196 N.E. 637 (1935).
o Compare Pearson v. Butts, 224 Iowa 376, 276 N.W. 65 (1937) with Leet v. Union
Pacific R. Co., 25 Cal. (2d) 605, 155 P. (2d) 42 (1944). Cases collected, 160 A.L.R.
1450 (1946).
10 Principal case at 220, following Goodheart v. American Airlines, Inc., 1 N.Y.S.
(2d) 288 (1938) but citing Leed v. Robert Joshua, Ltd., 72 N.Y.S. (2d) 3 (1947) as
throwing doubt on the proper rule.
11 Goodheart v. American Airlines, Inc., supra note 10 at 291; Prosser, ''The Procedural Effects of Res lpsa Loquitur," 20 MrnN. L. REv. 241 at 265 (1936).
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ne'gligence. 12 .Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of evidence, 13 however, and regardless of
either the particular method of pleading or intended reliance, the benefit of the
doctrine will be denied if the proof, by disclosing the precise cause of the injury,
eliminates other possible inferences of negligence.14 On the other hand, the mere
introduction of evidence of possible specific negligence may not destroy other possible inferences from the circumstances of the particular case. 15 When these circumstances allow only limited possibilities of negligent conduct, any attempt to
prove specific negligence is likely to negate other possible inferences of negligence.16 However, if it is conceded that an aviation accident case is a proper one
for the use of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine,17 then the inferences of possible negligence are numerous, and, as was properly held in the principal case, the precise
establishment of specific negligence should be required to eliminate other possible
inferences.18 The principal case shows how common sense analysis of res ipsa
loquitur problems in terms of circumstantial evidence and the particular facts
involved could eliminate much of the confusion that surrounds use of the Latin
tag.19

Frank Bowen, Jr., S. Ed.

12

Principal case at 220.

13 Southern Pacific Co. v. Hanlon, (9th Cir. 1925) 9 F. (2d) 294; Barger v. Chelpan,
60 S.D. 66, 243 N.W. 97 (1932).
14 Gill v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 228 Minn. 164, 36 N.W. (2d) 785 (1949).
15 Cassady v. Old Colony Street R. Co., 184 Mass. 156, 68 N.E. 10 (1903); Leed v.
Robert Joshua, Ltd., supra note 10; cases collected, 93 A.L.R. 609 (1934).
16 Dufresne v. Theroux, 69 R.I. 280, 32 A. (2d) 609 (1943).
17Compare McLarty, "Res lpsa Loquitur in Airline Passenger Litigation," 37 VA. L.
R:sv. 55 (1951) with O'Conner, "Res lpsa in the Air," 22 IND. L.J. 221 (1947); cases
collected 6 A.L.R. (2d) 528 (1949).
18 Note 14 supra.
19 Galbraith v. Busch, 267 N.Y. 230 at 234, 196 N.E. 36 (1935); Prosser, "Res lpsa
Loquitur in California," 37 CALIF. L. R:sv. 183 at 232 (1949).

